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MULTIPLE PROSECUTION: FEDERALISM VS. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Multiple prosecution for one criminal offense is hostile to western legal
tradition.' In 1759 Blackstone noted that the plea of former conviction "is
grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England - that no
man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once for the same
offence."2 Blackstone's comment acquires even greater significance when one
realizes that when it was written a criminal defendant in England had no
right before reaching the dock to be told of the charges against him.3
At the same time English courts were expounding the double jeopardy
proscription, a doctrine of international law developed subjecting an individual to multiple prosecution. 4 If the circumstances of a crime invoke the
jurisdiction of several nations, each might prosecute. 5 The basic rule has been

altered little by later qualifications. 6
In a federated governmental system the two concepts collide: on the
one hand, successive prosecution by different states seems to offend the "universal maxim"r; yet at the same time, the concept of separate and distinct
sovereignties in the states permits multiple prosecution. 8 After an initial
tack toward favoring the "universal maxim" in resolving the dilemma, 9 the
United States Supreme Court fixed upon the concept of multiple sovereignty
and, consequently, allowed multiple prosecution. 0
This note seeks to explore the problems inherent in the juxtaposition of
the two differently grounded values as they present themselves in three contexts - state-federal, state-state, and state-municipal successive prosecution
cases. These three combinations are not exhaustive of all those possible;
nevertheless they are sufficient for an analysis of policy even if not for a
catalogue of factual situations in which double jeopardy problems arise.
Emphasis is laid upon multiple prosecution arising from the existence of
jurisdiction over a criminal actor and act in more than one court, governmental unit, or state.'
1. United States v. Wilkins, 848 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 888 U.S. 918
(1966). State constitutions in forty-five states include a double jeopardy prohibition. The
other five provide protection within their common law.
2. W. BLACmSTONE, CoMmENTAUs BooK IV (1759 ed.) §829, quoted in Note, Res Judicata in the Criminal Law, 1965 N.ZJ.J. 417, 418.
8. Weihofen, Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Procedure, 10 AM. J. LEGAL
Hr. 189 (1966).
4. E.g., Regina v. Anderson, L.R. I Cr. Cas. Res. 161 (1868).
5. Regina v. Anderson, L.R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 161 (1868); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIp

6.

RELATIONS

See RESrATE

LAw OF THE UNrrED STATEs §87

(1965).

T, supra note 5, §§40, 46-62.

7. Green v. United States, 855 U.S. 184 (1957).
8. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 877 (1922).
9. Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 815 (1909) (dictum); United States v. Furlong, 18
(5 Wheat.) 184 (1820) (dictum).
10. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 877 (1922).
11. The two charges must be virtually identical. Making that determination in
particular case requires consideration not only of the elements of the offenses charged,
also the elements of lesser included offenses. For purposes of this note, it is assumed
the "identical offense" requirement is met.
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Because the status of double jeopardy law in the United States is controlled, at least potentially, by the United States Constitution, an understanding of federal restrictions is indispensable for proper consideration of
state law. After federal restrictions have been delineated, analysis of the
positions taken by states - primarily Florida - will be undertaken. The note
will conclude with a discussion of policies, issues, and alternative means for
eliminating difficulties exposed.
FEDERAL MULTIPLE PROSECUTION PROHIBITIONS

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No
person .. .shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.
...
12 Multiple prosecution for the same crime in
the same federal tribunal falls clearly within this proscription. Mr. Justice
Black, writing in Green v. United States,13 explained that the Government
"with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense .... 14 If a person
is once placed in jeopardy for an offense, he "simply cannot be prosecuted
for that offense again, regardless of the reasonableness or unreasonableness or
the public interest which may bespeak a prosecution."' 15
The same notion bars multiple prosecutions between federal and territorial governments. In 1907, the United States Supreme Court held in Grafton
v. United States6 that prosecutions in both a federal court-martial and
a Philippine territorial court were by the same sovereign and that the second
prosecution was barred by the fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition.
The reluctance to grant separate sovereignty status to the federal-territorial
scheme has been restated succinctly in Puerto Rico v. Shell Co.: 7
Both the territorial and federal laws and the courts, whether exercising federal or local jurisdiction, are creations emanating from the
same sovereignty. Prosecution under one of the laws in the appropriate
court, necessarily, will bar a prosecution under the other law in another court.
In multiple prosecution cases involving concurrent and federal-territorial
jurisdiction, then, the defendant is protected by the fifth amendment. By
resting its decision on separate sovereignty analysis, however, the Supreme
Court articulated a rationale whereby protection ultimately was denied in
federal-state and state-state cases. Following several early decisions in which
the concept of dual sovereignty was suggested, 8 the Supreme Court enunciated
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
14. Id. at 187.
15. United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 252 F. Supp. 364, 367 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
16. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
17. 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937) (emphasis added).
18. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S.
(9 How.) 560 (1850); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
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its federal-state mandate in United States v. Lanza.19 Although some contrary authority existed,2 0 the Court held that one offense may be punished
in state and federal courts "as a crime against the peace and dignity of both."'
Lanza was followed in Abbate v. United States,2 2 where the defendant was
tried in the federal court after having been convicted by a state for substantially the same offense.23 Again, rather than looking to the threatening
prospect of double jeopardy, the Court accepted the Lanza rationale: to allow
the plea in bar would undermine respect for federal laws and their corresponding deterrent effect. 24 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, captured the in25
herent weakness of the majority position:

It is just as much an affront to human dignity and just as dangerous
to human freedom for a man to be punished twice for the same offense,
once by a State and once by the United States, as it would be for one
of these two Governments to throw him in prison twice for the offense.
The reverse of the problem
acquittal-

-

state conviction after federal conviction or

has received similar treatment. Bartkus v. Illinois,26 substantially

reiterating the reasoning of Lanza and Abbate, affirmed the state conviction
under its robbery statute after an acquittal in the United States court for the
federal offense of robbing a federally insured bank. The Supreme Court reasoned that reversal of the defendant's conviction in the state court would be "a
shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of
the States to maintain peace and order within their confines." 27 Mr. Justice
Black, in a vigorous dissent, asserted there is "[N]o . . . sound reason for
thinking that the successful operation of our dual system of government depends in the slightest on the power to try people twice for the same act."25
The judicial attitude of tolerating successive prosecutions by separate
governments has been criticized by some lower federal courts. In 1955, a
district court, referring to the Lanza decision, stated that "the spirit of the
rule against double jeopardy for one offense is certainly violated by allowing
the state prosecution of this defendant, but the letter of the law permits it."29
Collaterally, the 1964 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission30 detracts from the vitality of the Lanza
19. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
20. Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
184 (1820) (dictum).
21. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
22. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
23. The offense charged in the state court was conspiring'to injure or destroy the
property of another. The federal offense was conspiring to injure or destroy communication
facilities operated or controlled by the United States.
24. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922).
25. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959).

26. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
27. Id. at 137.
28. Id. at 156.
29.

United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 802 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (emphasis added).

30. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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rationale. Murphy held that one jurisdiction could not, absent a grant of
immunity, compel a witness to give testimony that might incriminate him
under the laws of another jurisdiction.3 The partial renunciation of the
dual sovereignty argument as to self-incrimination therefore weakens the
Lanza, Abbate, and Bartkus doctrine.
Soon after the Abbate and Bartkus decisions, the Attorney General advised all United States attorneys that the power to prosecute an individual
a second time for substantially the same act must be exercised with reluctance
and caution. 32 Nevertheless, no legal barrier exists to prevent a second prosecution by the federal government. Moreover, the Attorney General's statement
has no effect upon prosecution by a state after federal conviction or acquittal.
Multiple prosecutions by states are barred, if at all, by prohibitions in each
state.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

In 1937, the United States Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment did not extend the protection of the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment to the states. 33 The Court, over a period of years, has held,
36
3s
3
at least in effect, the first 4 and fourth amendments, just compensation,

self-incrimination,3 7 right to counsel,38 confrontation, 39 speedy trial, 40 and
cruel and unusual punishment 4 ' clauses to be comprehended in the fourteenth
amendment. Even so, a divided Court reaffirmed the holding that
the double jeopardy clause is not applicable to the states. 42 The Court recently indicated an interest in reconsidering its holding, 43 but to no avail.
44
The case did not present the issue properly.
Lower federal courts have construed the fourteenth amendment due
process clause more liberally than the Supreme Court. The Second Circuit

81. Id. at 77.
32. "No federal case should be tried when there has already been a state prosecution
for substantially the same act or acts without the United States Attorney first submitting
a recommendation to the Assistant Attorney General in the department. No such recommendation should be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the division without having it first brought to my [the Attorney General's] attention."
Quoted in 27 U.S.L.W. 2509 (U.S. April 7, 1959).
33. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
34. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Spevack v. Klein, 87 S. Ct. 625 (1967).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
43. Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966).
41.

42.

44.

Petitioner asserted that he was tried for the same offense after a prior acquittal.

The Court held that the first trial did not result in an acquittal and that therefore the
writ had been improvidently granted. Id. at 80.
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Court of Appeals stated that the fourteenth amendment "imposes some limi45
tations on a state's power to reprosecute an individual for the same crime."
46
In reversing the defendant's conviction on his second trial, the court stated:
To hold, as we do, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes some restrictions on a state's power to reprosecute,
thereby spanning the gap between the Fifth Amendment's double
jeopardy prohibition and a similar prohibition derived from state laws,
is to preserve this societal understanding and to read the Fourteenth
Amendment as entrusting the federal courts with a responsibility and
power to decide which reprosecutions by a state violate our basic notions of justice.
The same technique was employed by the District Court for North Carolina
in granting a writ of habeas corpus to a defendant who had been prosecuted
47
twice for the same offense by the state.
Aside from these isolated instances of "fundamental unfairness," states
are not bound by the fifth amendment. Since most criminal prosecutions are
initiated by states, local authorities therefore are responsible for defining
effective multiple prosecution prohibitions.
FLORIDA MULTIPLE PROSECUTION PROHIBITIONS

The Florida Constitution provides: "No person shall be subject to be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... "48 - language similar to the
fifth amendment. In 1944, the Florida Supreme Court held that the prior
prosecution must have taken place within the same jurisdiction to support
49
the plea of former jeopardy.
Later, in Ex parte Sirmans,50 the court interpreted the test as follows:

51

Courts of concurrent jurisdiction are of equal dignity as to matters
so cognizable and the uniform rule in both state and federal jurisdiction is: "In cases of concurrent jurisdiction in different tribunals, the
one first exercising such jurisdiction acquires control to the exclusion of
the other." (citations omitted)
As long as the second prosecution is in the same court as the first or in a
court in which venue might properly have been laid, the plea of former
jeopardy must be sustained. The principle, on its face, applies neither in a
situation involving a subsequent prosecution in a different state nor in a
situation where the two prosecutions involve a municipality and the state.
In neither case can venue be properly laid in either court: one state's courts
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 849 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 850.
Norkett v. Stallings, 251 F. Supp. 662 (E.D.N.C. 1966).
FLA. CONsr. DecI. of Rights §12.
State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18 So. 2d 478 (1944).
94 Fla. 832, 116 So. 282 (1927).
Id. at 840, 116 So. at 285.
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do not enforce criminal statutes of another state,5 2 and state courts do not
53
enforce municipal ordinances.
The general rule regarding subsequent prosecutions by different states is
that the plea of former jeopardy is not available. 54 Florida is in accord.
In Strobhar v. State,55 the defendant was charged with embezzlement in
Florida for acts that took place in Florida, after having been acquitted on
the same facts of the same crime, larceny after trust, in Georgia. After suggesting that Georgia might not have had jurisdiction, the court held that
even if Georgia did acquire jurisdiction to prosecute, she could not prevent
Florida from prosecuting for the violation of its law against embezzlement.
The supreme court pointed out that the judgment of the Georgia court
could not extend beyond the territorial limits of that state. The fact that
the two offenses were essentially the same made no difference.
The general rule is modified by statute in Florida for the crime of
dueling.5 6 It is substantially modified by more comprehensive statutes in
other states.5 7 Notwithstanding such statutory provisions, the rule in Strobhar
58
still claims considerable viability.
When the prosecutions are by the municipal and state authorities, the
same result is obtained. In Theisen v. McDavid,59 the defendant was accused of selling beer on Sunday, contrary to a municipal ordinance almost
identical with a state statute. The supreme court experienced little difficulty
in rejecting Theisen's argument that the existence of identical state and
municipal crimes subjected him to double jeopardy. The court found no
state law that would prevent a duly authorized municipality from passing an
52.

Strobhar v. State, 55 Fla. 167, 47 So. 4 (1908).

53. Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894) (semble).
54. See note 57 infra.
55. 55 Fla. 167, 47 So. 4 (1908).
56. FLA. STAT. §932.10 (1967).
57. Nineteen states prohibit prosecution for a crime when the crime charged is within
the jurisdiction of the United States, another state, or a territory, and the defendant has
been convicted or acquitted in one of those jurisdictions. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §12.20.010
(1962)); Arizona (ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-146 (1956)); California (CAL. PENAL CODE §656
(1965)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. §19-315 (1947)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §3-4 (C)
(Smith-Hurd 1961)); Indiana (IND. ANN. STAT. §9-215 (1956)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN.
§609.045 (1963)); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. §2432 (1956)); Montana (MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §94-5617 (1947)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §171.070 (1963)); New York (N.Y. CODE
CRIN. PROc. §139 (1958)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §29-03-13 (1960)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §25 (1951)); Oregon (ORE. REV. STAT. §131.240 (1) (1965)); South

Dakota (S.D. CODE §13.0506 (Supp. 1960)); Texas (TEx. CODE CRuit. PROc. art. 13.23 (1966));
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-25 (1953)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.43.040
(1961)); Wisconsin (VIs. STAT. ANN. §939.71 (1958)).
58. The state must show, however, that the crime did take place in the jurisdiction of
the court. Mounier v. State, 189 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1965). It might do so in the simplest
case by merely showing that all acts constituting the crime took place within the jurisdiction. Hobbs v. Cochran, 143 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1962). If a crime is begun in the jurisdiction,
even though it is completed in another jurisdiction, the court still may entertain the charge.
Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902). Likewise, if the crime is begun in another
jurisdiction and consummated in Florida, Florida acquires jurisdiction to prosecute to.
the entire crime. Foster v. State, 62 Fla. 52, 56 So. 945 (1911).
59. 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894).
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ordinance identical with a state statute. It argued that a municipality is to
be regarded as a body politic separate and distinct from the state and that,
therefore, the situation is analogous to the relationship existing between
states and the federal government. Since the state constitution mentions
subsequent prosecution for the same offense and the offenses are differentbeing against the laws of different bodies politic -the ordinance was held
not to violate the constitutional prohibition. The decision has been followed
since it was rendered in 1894, with no real discussion of its merits. 60 Florida,
61
again, is in accord with the generally held view. '
Florida law provides little protection for an accused about to be tried a
second time unless the prior prosecution was in the same court or one of
concurrent jurisdiction.62 In short, construction of the language of the Florida
Constitution has been restrictive- depending upon finely drawn distinctions
regarding jurisdiction. Construction of the federal guarantee has been more
liberal, but has not yet extended protection to state criminal defendants.
MULTIPLE PROSECUTION PROHIBITIONS: RATIONALE

Guarantees against multiple prosecution represent a policy of fairness,
consideration, and protection for one charged with crime. Repeated prosecution results in harassment of the accused and unfair advantage to the
state.63 The mere necessity of defending successive prosecution and the time,
trouble, and mental anxiety associated with such an endeavor would be
enough to show harassment without more. There are, unfortunately, more
material disadvantages connected with successive defenses. Attorneys, experts,
and the myriad needs of successful defense must be procured - usually at
great expense. If the accused is to avoid serving months in jail waiting trial,
he must repeatedly post bond. 64
All the disabilities of one charged with crime sit heavily upon a defendant; his travel is stringently controlled- and his employment opportunities are slight. Additionally, unequal advantage is conferred upon the state
by the opportunity to try a defendant again. When the state knows all the
60. State ex rel. Wilson v. Quigg, 154 Fla. 348, 17 So. 2d 697 (1944); Gilooley v. Vaughn,
92 Fla. 943, 110 So. 653 (1926); Bueno v. State, 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862 (1898); Hunt v.
Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 16 So. 398 (1894).
61. See text accompanying notes 108, 109 infra.
62. Several related issues should be noted. The prior prosecution must be criminal;
a statute merely authorizing a civil remedy does not raise a former jeopardy problem.
Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bryan, 93 Fla. 415,111 So. 801 (1927). A regulatory statute and the regulatory sanctions within it do not raise the former jeopardy issue.
State ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225 (1929). The municipality still must
establish its jurisdiction over the offense. Aguilera v. Miami, 115 So. 2d 421 (3d D.C.A. Fla.

1959).
63. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
64. The accused probably will have to pay the 10% commission of the bondsman. As
a prerequisite to executing a bail bond, the bondsman must charge a premium rate as
filed with and approved by the commissioner. 6 FLA. LAW & PROCEDURE Criminal Law
§258 (1957).
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§903.12, .13 (1967).-
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weapons in the defense arsenal and gains time to prepare rebuttal for the
second trial, the result may be altered.6 6 If the state prevails in the first
trial, however, the defendant does not have equal opportunity to research
and relitigate the issues determined against him. He is jailed.
Anyone connected with criminal administration could expand the list
of harassments caused or made possible by a second prosecution. This is not
to say that all possible instances of unfairness impinge on every defendant,
but all occur - frequently - to the disadvantage of defendants and dismay
of observers.67
Public policy militates against multiple prosecution. First, multiple trials
are expensive.6s If the first prosecution leads to failure, repetition hardly
would seem worth the expense. Second, the policy of bringing litigation
to an expeditious conclusion is frustrated. 69 In civil cases, concepts of partial
preclusion extend the policy to its fullest. The recent movement toward incorporating collateral estoppel concepts into the criminal law illustrates its
pervasiveness in that field. 70 Third, other constitutional guarantees are undermined by multiple prosecution. Statutes of limitation are circumvented by
allowing other governmental units first prosecution.71 Speedy trial guarantees
similarly are rendered ineffective. 72 The basic policy of protecting the defendant against stale charges, the defenses for which have disappeared with
the lapse of time, can be totally frustrated. Fourth, multiple punishment is
an absurdity. Punishment for crime serves a number of purposes, one of
which is returning the offender to society prepared to take up a normal, lawabiding role. Subjection to multiple punishment for the same offense can only
engender hostility. In reality, it increases, rather than diminishes, the prisoner's feeling of alienation from the community and sabotages objectives of
3
7

probation and parole.

Multiple Prosecution:SeparateSovereignty Doctrine
Against this array of arguments justifying Blackstone's "universal maxim"
stands the principle of federalism. States are considered sovereign. An indication of sovereignty is power to punish offenders against the public peace.74
66. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
187 (1957).
67. See St. Petersburg [Fla.] Times, May 9, 1967, at 10-b, col. 1.
68. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties, and the Intruding Constitution, 28
U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1961).

69. Id.
70. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Armco
Steel Corp., 252 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Cal. 1966); Busbee v. State, 183 So. 2d 27 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1966).
71. The filing of an indictment will prevent the running of the general two-year statute
of limitations in Florida. Loy v. Grayson, 99 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1957).
72. Cf., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).
73. See D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE (1959); Powers,
A Correctional Administrator's View of the Model Sentencing Act, 9

CRIME

&:DELINQUENCY

398, 402 (1963).
74. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
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Where prosecution by either a sister state or the federal government bars
subsequent prosecution, the home state is denied its sovereign power to prosecute for crimes committed within its jurisdiction.75
The importance of the federalism argument makes it necessary to examine
some of the hypotheses upon which it is based. The concept of crime against
the sovereign is traceable partly to the work of John Austin. To Austin, law
was a set of commands issued by a sovereign for the violation of which
definite penalties, or sanctions, were prescribed. Austin's sovereign was that
individual or group of individuals to whom the larger part of society
habitually gave obedience and who, at the same time, was not subject to the
dictates of any other higher authority. Disobedience was therefore a personal
transgression against another person - the sovereign.76 If an individual transgressed against the commands of several different sovereigns, then each could
exact the sanction he, personally, attached to his command. 77
This simplistic view of criminal law may operate satisfactorily in a monarchy, but it is totally inapposite in a federal system. 78 Nevertheless, one of
its consequences - multiple prosecution - has been extended to the federal
system by resort to its rationale.7 9 The confusion is attributable to failure to
distinguish the nature of the crime.
Crime is an offense against society and not against a king or the government. The government prosecutes violations of the criminal law, but that
does not mean that government is injured by the commission of the offense. It
is the social, economic, or moral stability of society that is offended by crime.
Prosecution by the government is undertaken as protector of the society not as the aggrieved party. The only really acceptable view of criminal prosecution in modern times therefore is not punishment for offenses against a
sovereign, but offenses against society. s0
Under this more modern view, the governmental unit prosecuting for
offenses would seem immaterial. Societal order might be maintained as well
by prosecution in one state as in another. This first form of the federalism
argument therefore cannot justify denial of protection from multiple prosecution in any of the three situations chosen for study.8' It simply does not conform to modern concepts of criminal law.
Erosionof State Powers

There exists, however, a second form of the federalism argument. If the
remedy for multiple prosecution were extension, through the fourteenth
amendment, of the federal multiple prosecution prohibition, then the
federal government would acquire supervision of another area of state in75.

Bartkus v. Illinois, 859 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).

76.

J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 76 (1964).

77.

See Regina v. Anderson, L.R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 161 (1868).

78. J. STONE, supra note 76, ch. 2, §7.
79.

See Theisen v. McDavid, 84 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894).

80. Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustrationof Human
Rights, 17 U. MiAMi L. REv. 306, 827 (1968).
81.

Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 156 (1959).
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itiative. To the extent state decisions would be subjected to federal court
approval, state hegemony would be eroded. Before applying the federal
guarantee to the states, therefore, the court must decide that the importance
of the right to be secured -insulation from double jeopardy -overcomes
the resulting erosion of state power.
Recent litigation under the fourteenth amendment due process and equal
protection clauses indicates that an election already has been made in favor
of federal regulation in the field of fundamental human rights.

82

Perhaps

that election was implicit in Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v.
Connecticut83 where he declared that those of the guarantees in the first
eight amendments inculcating "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"' s were a part
of the fourteenth amendment. More recent cases indicate that the "fundamental principles" are now considered more far-reaching than they were by
Mr. Justice Cardozo.85
Such an election in the field of basic human rights is sound. Uniformity
from state to state is important. If a right is indeed basic, mere geographical
location should not alter its properties. The fourteenth amendment itself
seems to exclude geography as a material variable.8 6 Problems also exist
in the double jeopardy field that are beyond the power of states to resolve,
even if they were disposed to do so. For example, states cannot prevent the
federal government from prosecuting- regardless of multiple jeopardy implications. It seems anomalous for the Supreme Court to enunciate standards
as specific as those of Miranda v. Arizona in the confessions area and leave
the field of double jeopardy devoid of any pronouncement. Certainly, both
areas present at least the same possibilities for wrongful conviction, and
in both the values involved are similar.
FederalismArgument: Municipal-State Context
Even if the federalism argument might once have justified toleration of
federal-state and state-state multiple prosecutions, at no time could it logically
support the holding in state-municipal cases. In Grafton v. United States, 8
a member of the United States armed services killed two Filipinos while on
sentry duty. The soldier was acquitted of murder by a general court martial,
but was subsequently tried and convicted of "assassination" by the territorial
court in the Philippines. The highest territorial court, against an argument
that Grafton was placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, sustained the
conviction by analogizing to the federal-state cases. The Supreme Court of
the United States reversed. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, held
that both the military and the territorial court had jurisdiction to prosecute
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Supra notes 34-41.
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Id. at 328.
Supra notes 34-41.
See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
206 U.S. 333 (1907).
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for murder, but that since the military had done so first and the authority
of both courts was derived from the United States, the second prosecution
for the same offense was barred by the fifth amendment. The Court looked
beyond the organizational formalities to see, realistically, that the United
States prosecuted in both situations. In short, the holding looks to substance
rather than to form.
In Theisen v. McDavid,9 the Florida Supreme Court looked at form
rather than substance in holding that the municipality was a governmental
entity separate from the state. The court, therefore, was able to analogize to
the federal-state cases under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and hold that there was no double jeopardy.
The United States Supreme Court decision in Grafton seems the more
sound. Municipalities are created by the state and may be dissolved by the
state at any time.90 Their powers are derived from and may be revoked by
the state. Territorial powers, likewise, are limited to those delegated by the
federal government. 9' The opposite is true in the federal-state situation.
States do not derive their power from the federal government. Their existence is not dependent upon congressional fiat. In essence, territories stand
in the same relation to the federal government as municipalities occupy in
relation to the state government. 92 The federal-state analogy adopted by
the Florida court is therefore improper. A governmental unit that is totally
dependent upon another, both for its powers and mere existence, cannot be
separate and distinct, as was held in Theisen. Neither form of the federalism
argument can counter the policies supporting the double jeopardy prohibition
when two governments do not exist.
In summary, whatever the dilemma inherent in the juxtaposition of
Blackstone's "universal maxim" and the jurisdictional doctrines of international law, those implications simply cannot logically extend to statemunicipal multiple prosecution cases. While the dilemma cannot be denied in
federal-state and state-state cases, it should be resolved in favor of federal
supervision. Although the policy decision appears to have long been reached,
implementation of that policy in the double jeopardy context still awaits
presentation of a proper case.
AvAILABLE REMEDIES

Regardless of constitutional provisions, modern judicial policies, and common law traditions, an individual can be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense today. The remedies suggested below are designed to implement
fully these prohibitions and decisively bar multiple prosecution.

89. 84 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894).
90.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §8.

91. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
92. See Kneier, Prosecution Under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double

Jeopardy, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 201 (1930).
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Application of Fifth Amendment to the States
Cichos v. Indiana93 purported to be a case giving the Supreme Court an
94
opportunity to reconsider the substantive issue of Palko v. Connecticut.
Because it did not do so, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently
granted. 95 The issuance of the writ, however, disclosed a disposition on the
Court to look at double jeopardy and the due process clause once again.
The initial effect and ultimate ramifications of reversing Palko and extending the double jeopardy clause to the states is uncertain. State-municipal
multiple prosecutions probably would be barred since the state-municipal
situation is sufficiently analogous to the federal-territorial scheme to be controlled by Grafton v. United States.96 The separate sovereignty concept, often
the rationale upon which state-municipal multiple prosecutions are based, is
not, however, the sole argument advanced to justify successive prosecutions.
It is commonly asserted that municipal violations are civil rather than
97
criminal and that therefore double jeopardy protections do not apply.
But recent United States Supreme Court decisions indicate a rejection of
this reasoning. In 1965 the Court held that a forfeiture proceeding was "quasicriminal" in nature, 98 stating that the object of such a proceeding "like a
criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against
the law." 99 Juvenile proceedings, traditionally labeled as "civil," also have
been accorded the status of "criminal" for purposes of due process guarantees. 10 These decisions thus suggest that state-municipal multiple prosecutions
would be barred upon application of federal double jeopardy protections to
the states.
Federal-state successive prosecutions, on the other hand, cannot be categorized as repugnant to the fifth amendment prohibition under present law.
Application of double jeopardy protections to the states, absent an express
overruling of the Lanza, Abbate, and Bartkus cases, would leave unchanged
the constitutionality of federal-state multiple prosecutions. Until these cases
are expressly denounced, successive prosecutions of this nature may continue,
limited only by the Attorney General's mandateo 1 and decisions of lower
federal courts.

0 2

Successive prosecution between states has been the subject of consideration
in state courts but not federal courts. Application of the fifth amendment
provision to the states therefore would present a matter of first impression for
the Supreme Court. For this reason, speculation and conjecture are the only

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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100.
101.
102.

385 U.S. 76 (1966).
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Supra note 44.
206 U.S. 333 (1907); see text accompanying note 88 supra.
Supra note 92.
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
Id. at 700.
Application of Gault, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967).
Supra note 32.
United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 802 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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available devices through which the Court's probable position can be ascertained.
Lanza, Abbate, and Bartkus, implementing the application of double
jeopardy to the states, might provide support for allowing state-state multiple
prosecutions. Since each state must preserve its "peace and dignity" and
since states do not emanate from the same sovereignty, the Supreme Court's
rationale feasibly could bolster the constitutionality of such successive prosecutions. On the other hand, the rejection of state-state successive prosecutions
finds support in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,13 a Supreme Court case
in which the separate sovereignty theory was, in effect, rejected. Disrespect for
and hindrance of federal law enforcement, policy considerations enunciated
in Abbate v. United States,10 4 do not exist in the state-state situation. If
double jeopardy is comprehended by the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court will be forced to choose between these conflicting lines of authority.
A Statutory Solution
Application of the double jeopardy clause to the states, however, is only
one possible solution. Another alternative contemplates "barring" statutes,
similar to those now enacted in nineteen states.10 5 The Alaska statutory provision is reasonably representative:"06
When an act charged as a crime is within the jurisdiction of the
United States, another state, or a territory, as well as of this state,
a conviction or acquittal in the former is a bar to the prosecution for
it in this state.
The statute quoted provides basically the same protection as that proposed by the Model Penal Code. However, the Code provision permits a
second prosecution in another jurisdiction if "the law defining each of such
offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil."'307 The
ambiguity of the qualification, however, makes it unique in form rather than
in substance. The inherent danger is its possible scapegoat appeal- multiple
prosecutions could be permitted under such a provision by artificially labeling
particular laws as intended to guard against different evils.
"Barring" statutes have not been enacted with a specific prohibition against
state prosecution after prior conviction or acquittal in a municipal court.
At present, three states prohibit such prosecutions by statute01 and five others
indicate prohibition by case law.09 Aside from this minority, municipal
103. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
104.

359 U.S. 187 (1959).

105. Supra note 57.
106. ALAS.A STAT. §12.20.010 (1962).
(a) (Proposed Official Draft,
107. MODEL PENAL CODE §1.10 (1)
108. Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-1225 (1947)); South
§17-502 (1962)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §19.1-259 (1950)).
109. California (In re Sic., 73 Cal. 142, 14 P. 405 (1887));
Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958)); Michigan (People v.
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prosecutions do not bar subsequent prosecutions by either a state or the
federal government. 110 For this reason, barring statutes should comprehend
the situation. Rather than a narrow, grudging application,"' rigid compliance
with such a statute would truly guarantee protection from multiple
prosecution.
Hybrid solutions, such as joint trials conducted by the state and federal
1 3
have been suggovernments1 1 2 or implementation of "social interest" tests,'

gested. Within the framework of practical considerations, however, the alternatives suggested above present conduits through which double jeopardy
protection can be guaranteed to all persons.
CONCLUSION

Successive prosecution by separate governments has evolved within a system that repudiates the idea of trying a person twice for the same offense.
Legal fiction and antiquated dogma have produced an irreconcilable schism detrimental to the individual and, ultimately, to society. Appropriate remedial action, whether it be by the judiciary or the legislature, is needed now.
Whether such implementation will materialize remains to be seen. Until it
does, multiple prosecution prohibitions will remain depreciated and ineffective constitutional guarantees.
EARL

M.

DONALD

BARKER, JR.

J. HALL

N.W. 1124 (1889)); Minnesota (State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959));
New Jersey (State v. Mark, 23 N.J. 162, 128 A.2d 487 (1957)).
110. Smith v. United States, 243 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1957).
111. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957).
112. Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions: A Suggested Solution, 34 So. CAL. L. REV. 252 (1961).
113. Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of Human
Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 306 (1963).
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